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CAN LOUISIANA'S SUCCESSION LAWS SURVIVE IN
LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT
RECOGNITION OF ILLEGITIMATES' RIGHTS?
As a result of several recent United States Supreme Court
decisions,' the inferior status attributed to children born out of
wedlock in many states has been seriously questioned. Consti-
tutional attack has focused on distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children in intestate inheritance rights; this
focus is of particular concern to Louisiana since legitimacy
distinctions are prominent in our intestacy laws.' What, if any,
legal distinctions based on legitimacy may continue to exist
under the federal equal protection clause and the Louisiana
1. Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
2. For instance, Louisiana is the only state which does not permit illegitimate
children to inherit automatically from the natural mother. Louisiana Civil Code article
918 excludes acknowledged illegitimate children from the mother's succession when
she has legitimate descendants. The treatment of the illegitimate regarding intestate
inheritance rights in Louisiana depends on his or her initial classification. The Civil
Code categorizes children as either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated. LA. Civ.
CODE art. 178. Legitimates are those children born during marriage. LA. CIv. CODE art.
179. Illegitimates are those born out of wedlock who have not been subsequently
legitimated. LA. CIv. CODE art. 180. Legitimated children are those born out of mar-
riage whose parents have later married and have also formally or informally acknowl-
edged the children prior to or after marriage. LA. Civ. CODE art. 198. A child may also
be legitimated by either parent by an authentic act declaring the intention to legiti-
mate the child if there be no legal impediment to marriage either at the time of
conception or legitimatiop and the parent has no legitimate descendants at the time
of the notarial act. LA. Civ. CODE art. 200. Louisiana law also classifies illegitimates
as those "born from two persons, who, at the moment when such children were con-
ceived might have legally contracted marriage with each other; and those who are born
from persons to whose marriage there existed at the time some legal impediment." LA.
CIv. CODE art. 181. The latter are either adulterous or incestuous bastards. LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 182, 183. A parent may elevate his illegitimate child's status above the level
of bastard to the level of natural child without fully legitimating him, through the act
of acknowledgment. This procedure entails the parent's execution of a declaration in
an authentic act whenever there has not been such an acknowledgment in the registry
of birth or baptism of the child. LA. CIv. CODE art. 203. The Code limits this device to
parents who were capable of contracting marriage at the time of conception or to
parents who later contract a legal marriage. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 198, 204. Louisiana
judicial decisions have also recognized an informal acknowledgment when the parent
treats the child as his own. See note 126, infra. See also Lorio, Succession Rights of
Illegitimates in Louisiana, 24 Lov. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1978).
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constitution 3 is the subject of this comment. A determination
of the validity of Louisiana's intestate inheritance laws with
respect to illegitimates must be made in light of state and
federal court decisions outlining the constitutional require-
ments for such validity.
United States Supreme Court Decisions
There have been three recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court on the validity of state intestate succes-
sion laws dealing with illegitimate children. Two of these deci-
sions, Labine v. Vincent4 and Lalli v. Lalli,5 upheld the state
laws involved; the remaining case, Trimble v. Gordon,' held
the state law unconstitutional. Labine, the first case to reach
the Supreme Court on this issue, determined the constitution-
ality of Louisiana Civil Code article 919, which excludes the
acknowledged illegitimate child from the intestate succession
of the father when the father has legitimate collateral rela-
tions.' Due to public acknowledgment by the father, plaintiff
in that case was classified as a "natural child."8 SHe argued
that the Louisiana law violated the equal protection clause by
barring an acknowledged illegitimate from sharing equally
with legitimate children in the intestate estate of the father. If
plaintiff had been legitimate she would have excluded the fa-
ther's legitimate collateral relations;' even as an acknowledged
illegitimate, she would be able to exclude the mother's collat-
eral relations in her mother's estate.'0 Despite the strength of
plaintiff's argument, the Court refused to strike down this stat-
ute, holding instead that "the power to make rules to establish,
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws .... No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliations .
4. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
5. 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978).
6. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
7. Louisiana Civil Code article 919 does allow the illegitimate child of the father
alimony when he is excluded by other heirs.
8. See note 2, supra.
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 902.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 918.
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protect and strengthen family life as well as to regulate the
disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there
is committed by the Constitution of the United States and the
people of Louisiana to the legislature of that state."" In rebut-
tal the dissent quite correctly pointed out that the majority's
analysis refused to consider whether there was any rational
basis for the difference in treatment but focused instead on the
state's power to pass inheritance laws, a power not ques-
tioned. 2
Six years later in Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court
was confronted with an Illinois statute allowing the illegitimate
child to inherit from the mother but not from the father unless
the parents married and the father acknowledged the child. 3
Under this intestate statute plaintiff could not inherit from her
father even though a paternity order recognizing the deceased
as her father had been issued during his lifetime. Plaintiff at-
tacked the statute as an unconstitutional discrimination
against illegitimates. As in Labine, if plaintiff had been a legit-
imate child she would have inherited the entire estate of her
father, 4 and even as an illegitimate, she could inherit the entire
estate of her mother. Thus, in Trimble and Labine somewhat
similar statutes were challenged with the same constitutional
argument.' Nevertheless, in Trimble a different result fol-
lowed, perhaps due to a change in constitutional analysis. Al-
though the test used was not one of strict scrutiny, it was "not
a toothless one" either; instead, it lay midway between strict
11. 401 U.S. at 538.
12. Id. at 548. The dissent concluded that only a moral prejudice prevalent in
1825 when the Louisiana statutes were adopted could support the discrimination found
in the statute. Id. at 558.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973). Section 12 has since been recodified,
although the part of the section at issue in Trimble remained unchanged. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1976).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1(b) (1976).
15. The plaintiff in Trimble also argued that section 12 violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of
sex. Because the Court concluded that the illegitimacy classification was unconstitu-
tional, the Court did not reach this second contention. 430 U.S. at 766. A further
argument used by the appellant below, abandoned in the Supreme Court, was that
section 12 discriminated on the basis of race because of its alleged disproportionate
impact on Negroes. Id. at 765 n.10.
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scrutiny and rational basis analysis.'"
Four justifications for the Illinois statute were offered by
the state and rejected by the Court. The first of these, the
promotion of legitimate family relationships, was discredited
by the majority as an attempt to influence the actions of par-
ents by imposing sanction% on their innocent children." The
absence of an insurmountable barrier justification, of constitu-
tional significance in Labine, was characterized as nothing
more than an analytical anomaly.'" The argument that the
16. Although the fourteenth amendment mandates that no state deny a person
equal protection, certain classifications by statutes may be valid if all persons similarly
situated are treated similarly. To determine validity, various tests have been pro-
pounded by the Supreme Court. The "two tier approach" to equal protection is the
traditional approach. The lower tier is one of rational basis analysis in which a statute
is held invalid only if the classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964). The higher tier of analysis is one of strict scrutiny in which the
standard of review is so stringent that few statutes survive it. This test is whether the
classification scheme is necessary to accomplish a compelling state purpose. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). However, this test is only applied if the classifica-
tion is deemed "suspect" or the interest involved is "fundamental." Suspect classifica-
tions include race, nationality, and alienage. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
Interests considered "fundamental" include the right to vote, to travel interstate, and
to adequate judicial review. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). A middle level approach has recently surfaced in which the Court focuses more
on "means" and "ends." Concentration is upon the character of the classification, the
importance of the governmental benefits that the class is deprived of, and the asserted
state interest in support of the classification. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-
21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Illegitimacy has not been labeled as a suspect
classification nor have inheritance rights been deemed fundamental. Therefore, they
are subject to this middle level of scrutiny. Concluding that classifications based on
illegitimacy are not suspect, the Court decided that the strict scrutiny test would be
inappropriate. However, citing Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), the Court held
that the appropriate test was "not a toothless one" either. 430 U.S. at 766. Using a
balancing approach as in Trimble the Supreme Court in Lalli v. Lalli clarified the
equal protection analysis to be applied to illegitimates; statutes are invalid under the
fourteenth amendment "if they are not substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests." 99 S. Ct. at 523. See note 34, infra, and accompanying text. See also Lorio, supra
note 2, at 9-12.
17. The Court, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972), stated: "Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 430 U.S. at 769-70.
18. In Labine, the Court found no insurmountable barrier to inheritance since
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statute mirrored the presumed intent of citizens of the state
was dismissed since reflecting presumed intent was not a pur-
pose in the enactment of the Illinois law.'" Having completely
rejected all but one ground of the Labine rationale, the Su-
preme Court recognized as valid the state interest in establish-
ing an orderly and efficient method of property disposition, and
acknowledged that the Illinois statute addresssed threats to
this interest arising from the difficulty of proving paternity and
the danger of spurious claims. 0 Deviating from its position in
Labine of absolute deference to state power over property dis-
position,' the Court held that "[d]ifficulties of proving pa-
ternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory
,Adisinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intes-
tate."22 The majority concluded that the Illinois law could not
be squared with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it was over-inclusive in encompassing all
illegitimates, even those whose paternity could be ascertained
without delaying or burdening the succession procedure.2 3
Although the Supreme Court in Trimble refrained from
overruling Labine outright, it did overrule the Labine standard
of scrutiny as applied to state intestacy laws.24 The two cases
may be reconciled due to the differences in the state statutes.
the plaintiff's father could have provided for her by writing a will, legitimating her by
authentic act, or by marrying her mother. 401 U.S. at 539. See note 2, supra. But the
Court in Trimble found that "hard questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical
reshuffling of the facts." 430 U.S. at 774.
19. The Court said that the true purpose in the enactment of section 12 was to
provide a system more just to illegitimate children than the prior law. 430 U.S. at 776.
20. Id. at 771.
21. Id. at 776 n.917.
22. Id. at 772. Whether the statute is carefully tuned to alternative considera-
tions must be considered. For example, a statute could reasonably bar illegitimates
from inheritance from the father if it also allowed for occasions where paternity could
be proven in an accurate and reliable manner. The Illinois law provided no such
alternative.
23. Id. at 771, 776. The Court carefully noted that the states are free to fashion
their own requirements of proof, such as a prior adjudication or formal acknowledg-
ment of paternity. "[W]e would hav a different case if the state statute were care-
fully tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing
paternity." Id. at 772 n.14.
24. "To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Lobine the
more recent analysis controls." Id. at 776 n.17.
1136 [Vol. 39
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In Illinois, every illegitimate child was totally barred from in-
heriting from his father, though he would be treated equally
with legitimate children in his mother's succession. In Louis-
iana, the acknowledged child born out of wedlock can inherit
from the father in the absence of any other heirs; he can like-
wise inherit from the mother, though not on a par with legiti-
mate children. In any event, the illegitimate is entitled to at
least alimony.2' Essentially, the Louisiana statute dictates an
order of succession with which the Court would not interfere,
while the Illinois law designates the specific persons who are
entitled to inherit.
Despite the fact that the Illinois and Louisiana statutes
can be distinguished on these narrow grounds, it is likely that
Labine has been effectively overruled. 6 In Labine, the Court
upheld article 919 which allows acknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren to inherit from the father only if there are no other heirs.
Trimble, however, seemed to require that once there is an adju-
dication or formal acknowledgement, the state must allow ille-
gitimates to inherit from their fathers if legitimates have that
right. By placing the acknowledged illegitimate at the end of
the succession line to his father's property and allowing him to
exclude only the state, this law treats illegitimates, who have
proven their paternity in a manner recognized for inheritance,
unequally with legitimate children. 7 Additionally, like the Illi-
25. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 918-20.
26. In fact, Labine was probably an anomaly long before Trimble. An Ohio court
of appeal in Green v. Woodward, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974), struck
down a statute whereby illegitimate children could inherit from the father only when
the child was legitimated by adoption or acknowledgment. The court distinguished
Labine by saying that in Labine, the discrimination was between illegitimates and
legitimates, whereas in Green, the discrimination was within the class of illegitimates,
i.e., illegitimates inheriting from the mother as opposed to inheriting from the father.
Id. at 113, 318 N.E.2d at 406. In Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975), a federal
statute incorporating Wisconsin inheritance law had, prior to its amendment in 1971,
allowed legitimates and illegitimates to share equally in the estate of their mother but
excluded the illegitimate completely from any share in the estate of any relative of the
mother. The court held that Labine did not control since the fifth amendment prevents
the federal government from discriminating. 524 F.2d at 15.
27. The discriminatory treatment in Civil Code article 919 does not relate to
evidentiary standards, which Trimble found may be reasonable, but rather applies to
the order of succession. As a result, acknowledged illegitimate children of intestate
men will rarely be entitled to inherit since there will almost certainly be a relative,
although distant, lurking in the background.
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nois law, the treatment of acknowledged illegitimates in the
succession of the father differs from that afforded illegitimates
in the succession of the mother.2
After Trimble established the only remaining barrier to
absolute equality for illegitimate children to be a proof of pa-
ternity, a predictable subsequent development was a decision
dealing with the kind of prodf that a state can constitutionally
require as a prerequisite to inheritance. This step came at the
end of 1978 with the decision in Lalli v. Lalli.20 The New York
statute at issue required illegitimate children who would in-
herit from their father through intestate succession to provide
a particular form of proof of paternity-a judicial decree of
filiation pronounced during the father's lifetime.30 Plaintiff did
not have such a judicial order but produced instead a notarized
document in which the father, in consenting to plaintiffs mar-
riage, referred to him as "my son," along with several affidavits
by persons who stated that the father had acknowledged plain-
tiff openly and often.' Although plaintiff argued that the re-
quirement of a specific form of proof of paternity denied him
equal protection,32 the Supreme Court upheld the state's con-
stitutional right to mandate such exclusive proof. Using the
same type of balancing approach as it had in Trimble, the
Court remarked that although "classifications based on illegi-
timacy are not subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless
are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not
substantially related to permissible state interests." '3'
The primary state goal acknowledged by the Court was
28. See note 2 and text at note 7, supra.
29. 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978).
30. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1964).
31. 99 S. Ct. at 522 n.3.
32. Plaintiff also claimed that the law unconstitutionally discriminated on the
basis of sex, but the question was not considered as it was raised for the first time in
the Supreme Court. Id. at 522 n.3.
33. Section 4-1.2 requires that the order of filiation be made not only during the
life of the father, but that the proceeding-be commenced during pregnancy or within
two years from birth. The Court limited its decision by not passing on the constitution-
ality of the two year statute of limitations. Id. at 524 n.5.
34. Id. at 523. In its opinion, the Supreme Court firmly established the
"substantial relation" test as the proper approach in analyzing illegitimacy classifica-
tions. Id. at 524, 527, 528.
1138 [Vol. 39
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that of providing for the just and orderly distribution of prop-
erty at death."' The Court distinguished Trimble from Lalli on
the basis that the Illinois statute's total bar to illegitimates
excluded a significant category of such children who could
present proof of their paternity,"6 while under the New York
statute marital status of the illegitimates' parents was irrele-
vant and the single6 requirement for inheritance was eviden-
tiary. 37 The majority commented that the strength of the stat-
ute in La li was that "the administration of an estate will be
facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainy mini-
mized, where the entitlement of an illegitimate child to-notice
and participation is a matter of judicial record before the ad-
ministration commences. '3
Also using the analysis that the means of discrimination,
to be valid, must be "substantially related to the legitimate
interests that the statute purports to promote, ' 39 the dissent
observed that the interest served, i.e., protection against fraud-
ulent and belated claims, could be promoted by less drastic
means, such as a formal acknowledgment of paternity, a short
statute of limitations, and publication and notice.'" An ironic
consequence of New York's more restrictive approach was
noted in the dissent's comment that it was difficult to imagine
an instance in which an acknowledged and voluntarily sup-
ported illegitimate child would ever inherit intestate under the
New York scheme, due to the apparent absence of a need to
institute such a paternity proceeding and the fear of provoking
35. The statute was held not defensible as an incentive to enter legitimate family
relationships. Id. at 523.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 524.
38. Id. at 526. The Court considered in depth the findings of the Bennett Com-
mission, created in 1961 by the New York legislature, which concluded that a number
of problems counsel against treating illegitimate children identically to other heirs.
These problems include: How does one cite and serve an illegitimate (if he is a distribu-
tee unconditionally) of whose existence the family is unaware? How may finality of
decree in any estate be achieved when there always exists the possibility, however
remote, of a secret illegitimate's existence. Even if the illegitimate is known, problems
of proof would make it difficult to expose spurious claims. Id. at 525-26.




disharmony with a father who is already voluntarily supporting
his child."
At first glance, the decision in Lalli appears to be a retreat
from the position taken by the Supreme Court in Trimble.
Trimble could have been interpreted to mean that discrimina-
tion against illegitimates who have proven their parenthood
would be prohibited, regardless of whether or not they met the
statutory requirements of proof of paternity in that state. 2
However, given a more careful reading, Trimble seems only to
establish the proposition that the requirements of a statute
with regard to proof of paternity must merely be reasonable
and not exclude a significant category of illegitimate children.13
Even accepting this proposition, it would have been difficult to
forecast the conclusion in Lalli which allowed a filiation order
to be mandated as the exclusive method of proof."
The Court in La li distinguished Trimble on two grounds,
the first of which was that, in Trimble, there was a total statu-
tory disinheritance of illegitimate children who were not legiti-
mated. By insisting upon both acknowledgment and marriage
of the parents, it excluded a significant category of illegitimate
children of intestate men whose inheritance rights could ac-
tually be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settle-
ment of estates or the dependability of titles. 5 This combina-
tion of requirements eliminated the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and a case-
by-case determination of paternity." In contrast, the New York
statute was found to provide such a middle ground since it did
not inevitably disqualify the entire group of illegitimates.47 The
41. Id. at 529-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the fear
of unknown illegitimates hardly justified cutting off the rights of known illegitimates.
Id.
42. "For at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate
men, inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement
of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under, intestacy laws.
Because it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, § 12 is
constitutionally flawed." 430 U.S. at 771.
43. See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
44. See note 23, supra.
45. 99 S. Ct. at 523.
46. Id. at 524.
47. The Court recognized that the New York law ensured accurate resolutions
1140 [Vol. 39
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other basis used by the Court to distinguish the two decisions
involved the state interests purportedly served by the statutes.
The encouragement of legitimate family relationships was not
argued as a justification for the New York law though such a
policy had been urged in support of the Illinois law.4"
Lai and Trimble together seem to establish the proposi-
tion that state statutes must afford illegitimates the same
rights accorded legitimate children with respect to intestate
successions, qualified by the state's freedom to provide the
manner by which parentage must be proven within reasonable
limits which do not exclude a significant category of illegiti-
mate children. 9 A puzzling problem which still remains after
Lai concerns the form of proof of paternity that will be consid-
ered reasonable as not excluding a significant group of illegiti-
mate children. Some guidance is offered by the Uniform Pro-
bate Code which does much to equalize the status of all chil-
dren by focusing on the biological relationship between parent
and child as the primary qualification for intestate inheritance.
It provides:
[A] person born out of wedlock is to be treated for the
purposes of intestate succession as a child of the mother,
but such a child is also to be treated as a child of the father
where the natural parents participate in a marriage cere-
mony before or after the birth of the child, even though the
attempted marriage is void, or where paternity is estab-
lished by an adjudication before death of the father or is
established thereafter by clear and convincing proof.50
This constitutionally permissible provision has already been
adopted in several states.5' Although it goes beyond what is
of claims of paternity. Accuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial
forum during the lifetime of the father. The father's availability will contribute to the
reliability of the fact-finding process and allow him to defend his reputation against
unjust accusations. Id. at 526.
48. Id. at 524.
49. See text at notes 43 & 47, supra.
50. UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 2-109 (1969 version).
51. Ten states have adopted this Uniform Probate Code provision: ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11.045 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-
109 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 1976);
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required in Lalli, it may serve as a guide to states desirous of
treating all children, proven to be such, equally.
Louisiana Decisions
A brief review of the Louisiana jurisprudence and its treat-
ment of illegitimate children and their inheritance rights both
before and after Trimble is essential before examining the
Louisiana law on this subject. As will be indicated by the fol-
lowing synopsis, every decision rendered by Louisiana courts
before Trimble upheld the succession scheme set forth in the
Louisiana Civil Code.
In Succession of Wesley,5" the constitutionality of article
921 was affirmed when the court stated that an illegitimate
child could not inherit from other children of his mother or
father born in lawful wedlock or from any legitimate relations
of the father or mother. Sixteen years later, another Louisiana
court faced the problem of illegitimates' rights in Succession of
Bush, "' when the validity of article 200 was questioned. Article
200 provides that only those natural children can be legiti-
mated who are offspring of parents who, at the time of concep-
tion, could have contracted marriage. Plaintiff, decedent's ille-
gitimate son, argued that an invalid act of adoption 4 should be
considered an act of legitimation,55 thereby allowing him to be
an heir to his father's intestate succession. Since the alleged
father was married at the time of plaintiff's conception, the
court relied on article 200 to exclude him, refusing to hold that
article unconstitutional."
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109 (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Burns 1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-213 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1977); S.D. UNIFORM PROB.
CODE § 2-109 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109 (1977).
52. 224 La. 182, 69 So. 2d 8 (1953).
53. 222 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
54. The act of adoption was an absolute nullity for lack of concurrence by dece-
dent's wife. Id. at 644.
55. See note 2, supra. Legitimated children are treated as legitimate and obtain
the same rights of inheritance. One Louisiana case that has extended inheritance rights
to illegitimate children through the process of legitimation is Succession of Mitchell,
323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975). In that case, the marriage of the children's biological parents
subsequent to the children's birth legitimated them, despite circumstances indicating
that the children may have been born of an adulterous connection.
56. The court was not disposed to extend the holding in Levy v. Louisiana, 391
1142 [Vol. 39
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In Strahan v. Strahan,57 a federal district court in Louis-
iana upheld the right of legitimate relations of the decedent to
prevent the father's alleged illegitimate son from inheriting
intestate from him.5" The court found the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children in the Louisiana succession
laws not to be arbitrary, focusing on the state's paramount
interest in encouraging marriage and the vital necessity of pro-
moting stability in land titles.5" The court emphasized the dev-
astating effect upon commercial land transactions which would
have resulted had the lawmakers permitted illegitimates to
share in a decedent's estate. 0
One of the few cases prior to Trimble' dealing with the
validity of Louisiana laws regulating testate successions was
Succession of Captain.' In that case, the testator left a will in
which he bequeathed all of his property to his seven natural
children."2 He was also survived by his mother, two brothers,
and a sister, who, relying on article 1486, which limits the right
of natural children to receive property by donation from their
natural father, 3 attacked the validity of the testator's be-
quests. Unpersuaded by the argument of the natural children
that this article violated the equal protection clause, the court
upheld article 1486 and limited the testator's donation to his
natural children to 'ne quarter of his property. Even though
Labine was an intestate succession case, the court relied on it
in stating that the "regulation of descent and distribution [is]
peculiarly within the powers reserved for the states. These pro-
U.S. 68 (1968), to a different codal article and different factual situation. 222 So. 2d
at 644. Levy held that illegitimates were included in the definition of "children" in
the Louisiana wrongful death act.
57. 304 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. La. 1969).
58. LA. CIv. CODE art. 919. See text at note 7, supra.
59. 304 F. Supp. at 40-42.
60. Id. at 42-44. "Had the lawmakers permitted illegitimate children to share in
a decedent's succession, no title to property would ever be secure and certain." Id. at
44.
61. 341 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
62. See note 2, supra.
63. Louisiana Civil Code article 1486 prohibits the natural father who has left
no legitimate descendants from donating more than one fourth or one third of his estate




visions. . . serve the vital interests of the state by encouraging
marriage, by discouraging illegitimacy, by promoting stronger
family ties and by contributing to the stability of land titles." 4
A vigorous dissent pointed out, however, that there is little
problem in establishing the validity of land titles in a testate
succession." ' Since the testator had expressly recognized and
devised his property to his illegitimate children, there would be
no occasion for problems involving fraudulent or belated
claims.
Only after the opinion in Trimble was rendered, however,
did a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court recognize the
insubstantial relationship between testate succession laws and
the stability of land titles. The two most recent Louisiana Su-
preme Court cases in the testate succession area" provide a
guide for judging the future validity of intestate succession
laws that deal with illegitimate children and may also indicate
the court's post-Trimble constitutional analysis of intestate
inheritance laws.6 7
In Succession of Robins," the testator willed his estate,
composed entirely of separate property, to his two illegitimate
sons who were conceived in adultery with a single woman. In
order to invalidate those legacies, the surviving spouse inter-
posed article 1488, which probibits a natural parent from giving
or willing an illegitimate any substantial part of his estate if
the child's conception resulted from the parent's adultery. 9
Careful to note that the court was not deciding whether illegiti-
64. 341 So. 2d at 1295.
65. Id. at 1296 (Watson, J., dissenting).
66. Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979);- Succession of Robins,
349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
67. Procedural determinations in two post-Trimble cases prevented the effect of
Trimble on our intestate inheritance laws from being scrutinized. Succession of Shaw,
360 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Succession of Matte, 346 So. 2d 1345 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1977). In Matte, the court ruled that since the claimant could not prove she
was decedent's child, she lacked standing to constitutionally attack articles 918 and
919 on the ground that they work an unconstitutional discrimination between the
acknowledged illegitimate children of the mother and those of the father. 346 So. 2d
at 1349.
68. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
69. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1488 restricts such dispositions to the "mere amount of
what is necessary to their sustenance, or to procure them an occupation or profession
by which to support themselves."
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mates could be treated differently from legitimates for pur-
poses of intestate or testate succession,70 but solely whether the
law may reasonably discriminate against adulterous bastards
within the class of illegitimates, the court held that article 1488
unreasonably discriminates against certain illegitimates be-
cause of their birth, thus violating the Louisiana constitution.7
In analyzing the state purposes rationally served by distinc-
tions between adulterous illegitimates and other illegitimates
with respect to their capacity to receive legacies from their
father, the court distinguished Labine as a case involving intes-
tate succession wherein the facilitation of a prompt determina-
tion of title to the property left by an intestate decedent was a
vital interest.72 The relevance of another interest in Labine, the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage, was discredited by the
court since the sanction was not aimed at the adulterous par-
ents, but rather at their children.73 The court stated:
However valid these may be as rational bases for differen-
tiated treatment of legitimate or illegitimate children for
purposes of intestate succession, these reasons do not af-
ford any rational basis to deny completely by statute any
right of an illegitimate child to receive a legacy given him
by his father's will solely because the child's conception
resulted from his father's admitted adultery-especially
where, as here, the father could have willed his estate to
non-adulterous illegitimates or to complete strangers.74
A vigorous dissent in Robins viewed article 1488 as an
integral part of the Louisiana succession system and the deci-
sion striking it down as jeopardizing all other legislation affect-
ing illegitimates. 5 It predicted an eventual effective invalida-
70. 349 So. 2d at 277.
71. Id. at 280. See note 3, supra.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 279. The court emphasized the irrationality of a sanction which af-
fected only certain children born of an adulterous act and not others. "In practical
effect, the only adulterous children affected are those born of a married father and an
unmarried mother-and then only if the father admits his parentage...." Id.
74. Id. at 280.
75. Id. at 281 (Summers, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that given the atten-
tion of the drafters of the Code to a "thorough legal system designed to sustain the
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tion of all laws of this state in which distinctions are based
upon illegitimate birth.7"
True to this prediction, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Succession of Thompson" struck down article 1483 which pro-
hibits an acknowledged illegitimate child from receiving a leg-
acy from his mother if she is survived by legitimate children.
In such an event, article 1483 would restrict the disposition to
what is strictly necessary to procure the child sustenance or an
occupation or profession to maintain him. The testator in
Thompson willed all of her property to her legitimate (laughter
and her acknowledged natural son. The legitimate child con-
tended that article 1483 prohibits such a disposition to the
illegitimate, while the illegitimate child argued that the article
violates the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, article 1, section 3,
which prohibits arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimi-
nation on the basis of birth.7 Commenting that this constitu-
tional provision refers to the entire range of discriminatory
practices based on illegitimacy,79 the court determined that the
validity of these classifications depended on the existence of a
rational basis for their enactment which is reasonably related
to a valid governmental purpose. 0
Using the analysis applied in Robins, the court questioned
the valid state purpose served by a statute which prohibits an
acknowledged illegitimate child from being a legatee merely
because his parent has legitimate descendants. Three justifica-
tions for such discrimination, approved in Labine, were offered
in support of article 1483, two of which were discredited in
family unit, protect the rights of property and accord to illegitimate children some
benefits of inheritance, it is inconceivable that these classifications were intended to
be abolished by Article 1, Section 3, of the Constitution of 1974 . Id. at 283
(Summers, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 285 (Summers, J., dissenting).
77. 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979).
78. See note 3, supra.
79. 367 So. 2d at 797. This statement addressed the legitimate child's arguments
that "birth" may refer to national origin, and that the purpose of the provision was
merely to abolish discrimination on the basis of birth with respect to state programs
aiding dependent children. Id.
80. Id. at 798. This test was also used by the court in Robins. 349 So. 2d at 278.
See note 16, supra.
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Trimble."' Although Labine had recognized the goal of the pro-
motion of family- life, the court pointed out that Trimble found
only an attenuated relationship between a statute discriminat-
ing against illegitimates and such a goal."2 The court also no-
ticed that the deterrent effect of such legislation is belied by
the statistics of illegitimate births.8 Furthermore, the court felt
that it is anomalous for those wholly innocent as regards the
condition of their birth to bear the full force of society's disap-
proval 4 Again citing Trimble, the court rejected the argument
that no insurmountable barrier restricted defendant from in-
heritance; such a theory cannot be used to eliminate constitu-
tional infirmities. 5 Disposing of the third justification offered
by the legitimate child, the court stated that "there is no
connection between a prohibition against a donation mortis
causa to an illegitimate child and land titles.""6 The court cited
the dissent in Captain and stated that a specific parental be-
quest by will raises no problems with land titles.87
Since the Captain case is a state appellate court decision,
its analysis is effectively -displaced by the more recent and
higher court's ruling in Thompson; in a challenge to article
1486 today, a finding of unconstitutionality could be fairly pre-
dicted. The majority in Captain relied on two justifications, the
promotion of the famhily and the stability of land titles,8 both
of which were rejected by the Thompson court as having no
relevancy to testate successions. The impact of these two
Louisiana decisions, Robins and Thompson, on the future of
other succession laws affecting illegitimates awaits further liti-
gation. However, they are indicative of a more liberal trend
81. See text at notes 17, 18 & 20, supra.
82. 367 So. 2d at 798.
83. Id. at 799. The court stated that the theory is undermined by public health
statistics which demonstrate that one out of every five children born in Louisiana is
illegitimate. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 800. This was in response to the legitimate child's argument that the
testator could have made the bequest through the legitimation process in article 200.
86. Id. at 798.
87. Id., citing Succession of Captain, 341 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977), (Watson, J., dissenting).
88. See text at note 64, supra.
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toward raising the status of illegitimates to a level commensu-
rate with that enjoyed by legitimates.
Proposals for Reform
A constitutional analysis of the Louisiana codal articles
relating to the rights of illegitimate children in the estates of
their parents entails not only the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 9 but
also, and perhaps more importantly, article 1, section 3 of the
Louisiana constitution. 0 The protection afforded by the Louis-
iana constitution is at least as great, if not greater than, that
of the federal Constitution. Birth is so important a classifica-
tion that the drafters of the Louisiana constitution chose to
specifically enumerate it. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court
in both Robins and Thompson relied solely on the Louisiana
constitution for the basis of their opinions, though influenced
by the Trimble analysis.
Three main categories of Louisiana succession law are pre-
sented in determining the constitutional revision required of
our Code. These are Louisiana testate succession laws, intes-
tate succession laws, and the principle of forced heirship.
Testate Succession Laws: Articles 1483-88
The Louisiana Supreme Court has struck down both Civil
Code articles 1488 and 1483 as violative of the Louisiana consti-
tution." These articles relate to testate successions and accord-
ingly are not directly affected by the United States Supreme
Court cases dealing with the intestate succession rights of ille-
gitimate children. There are no Supreme Court cases dealing
with the problems encountered by the Louisiana court in
Robins and Thompson, probably due to the fact that few, if
any, other states have such a comprehensive system to control
the disposition of one's property at death.
89. The fourteenth amendment states that "[nlo state shall make or enforce
any law which shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
90. See note 3, supra.
91. Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); Succession of Robins,
349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
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By both federal and state constitutional analysis, articles
1483-88 of the Louisiana Civil Code appear to be clearly viola-
tive of equal protection. As previously noted, articles 1483 and
1488 have been successfully challenged.2 Both of these provi-
sions restrict the natural mother and father alike, and limit
dispositions to their natural children to amounts necessary to
maintain them in the event that the children were born of an
adulterous or incestuous union or that the parents had legiti-
mate descendants surviving them. Articles 1484 and 1485 affect
the natural mother alone and allow her to dispose of her entire
estate to her natural children when she has left no legitimate
descendants. However, if she leaves such children only a part
and disposes of the rest in favor of other persons, her natural
-children have an action against her heirs only for what is neces-
sary for their support. Articles 1486 and 1487 apply solely to the
natural father, permitting him to dispose of a limited portion
of his estate in favor of his natural children only when he leaves
no legitimate descendants and only if he bequeaths the rest of
his property to his legitimate relatives or to public institutions.
In order for this difference in treatment of illegitimate and
legitimate children to be valid, there must be a rational basis
for the differentiation which is reasonably related to a valid
governmental purpose.' 3 It has been pronounced by the Louis-
iana Supreme Court that the interest of the state in the stabil-
ity of land titles has no connection with the problem of a par-
ent's decision to will property to his illegitimate child, 4 and the
only other justification advanced for restricting such disposi-
tions is the promotion of legitimate family ties. Although this
was considered a permissible state interest in Labine, it was
deemed in Trimble to have at most an attenuated relationship
to the state statute. 5 Such an attenuated relationship does not
satisfy the constitutional test requiring more than a minimum
rational relationship between the state's interest and a statu-
tory classification. Unless a valid reason for the discrimination
92. Id.
93. See note 80, supra, and accompanying text.
94. See text at notes 72 & 86, supra.
95. See text at notes 82, 83 & 84, supra. The majority in Thompson recognized
that the Trimble analysis prevails over that of Labine.
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is advanced, it appears that in the future there will be no
limitations on the rights of parents to dispose of their property
in favor of children born out of wedlock. Of course, this conclu-
sion is modified by the qualification that no disposition may
impinge on the inheritance of a forced heir." Another factor not
relevant to intestate successions weighs against the validity of
these articles. The will of the testator is deemed paramount in
testate successions and is to be given effect in strictest accord-
ance with his testament unless clearly outweighed by counter-
vailing interests. A countervailing interest of sufficient weight
is forced heirship, which is considered to be so important in
preventing disinherison that it is protected in our state consti-
tution. 7 However, in balancing the importance of the testator's
intent against the tenuous justification for restricting his dispo-
sitions to his natural children, the former clearly outweighs the
latter and should prevail. Instead of inhibiting such disposi-
tions, society should commend these parents for accepting
their responsibilities to their children.
Intestate Succession Law: Articles 917-921
As yet, no decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held unconstitutional the Louisiana intestate succession
scheme's treatment of illegitimates. Therefore, the analysis of
Louisiana intestate laws must be made in light of Labine,
Trimble and Lalli with an eye to Louisiana Supreme Court
pronouncements in the realm of testate successions. Clearly,
the only justification which can be suggested in support of
constitutionality is the state interest in the orderly and effi-
cient disposition of property at death." In Lalli, the constitu-
tional test was unequivocally held to be one in which the de-
mands visited on the illegitimates must "bear an evident and
substantial relation to the particular state interest the statute
is designed to serve."" Therefore, attention is focused on
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493.
97. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5. See text at note 118, infra.
98. The court in both Thompson and Robins discredited any connection between
succession laws and the protection of the legitimate family. See text at notes 73, 82,
83 & 84, supra.
99. 99 S. Ct. at 524.
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whether the following classifications are substantially related
to the concern over the stability of land titles.
Within the class of acknowledged illegitimate children,200
the order of intestate succession differs depending on whether
the child is to inherit from the mother or from the father. An
acknowledged illegitimate child inherits from the mother to the
exclusion of other kindred according to article 918, unless she
has also left legitimate children or other descendants. Under
article 919 an acknowledged illegitimate inherits from the fa-
ther only to the exclusion of the state. In the event the acknowl-
edged illegitimate is excluded in either of the above situations,
the child's rights will be reduced to a moderate alimony. Adul-
terous and incestuous bastards do not inherit in any event, but
are restricted to a mere alimony by article 920. Finally, article
921 restricts the right of natural children to inherit from the
legitimate relations of their parents.
Article 918 places the illegitimate child in a relatively high
position with respect to the estate of his mother. However, it
should be pointed out that Louisiana is the only state that
distinguishes between legitimates and illegitimates as to intes-
tate inheritance rights from the mother. 0' Constitutional anal-
ysis of this article requires an inquiry into the state purposes
served by a statute which prohibits an acknowledged illegiti-
mate child from being an heir of his mother merely because she
has legitimate descendants. The recurring justifications for
such restrictions are the fostering of stability of land titles and
the promotion of the legitimate family. Just as there is no
connection between the former interest and testate succes-
sions,' "02 there is likewise no connection between this interest
and the intestate succession of the mother. The relative ease
of proving maternity dissipates any problems of fraudulent and
belated claims to the mother's estate.10 The latter interest has
been discredited in Trimble, Robins and Thompson as a device
100. See note 2, supra.
101. See Hallisey, Illegitimates and Equal Protection, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543
(1977); Lorio, supra note 2, at 4.
102. See text at notes 72 & 86, supra.
103. In LaWi, the Court noted that establishing maternity is seldom difficult
since the child's birth is usually a recorded event taking place in the presence of others.
99 S. Ct. at 525.
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which visits the sins of the parents on the heads of their inno-
cent children. Article 918 thus bears no relationship to a legiti-
mate state objective.
Whether article 919 bears a substantial relationship to per-
missible state purposes must be examined against the back-
ground of Labine. Labine upheld article 919 and allowed the
legitimate collateral relations of the father to exclude his ac-
knowledged illegitimate child, using a minimal rationality
approach.'"4 Reexamining this article in terms of the constitu-
tional test provided in Trimble, the primary and probably only
legitimate justification for differentiation today is the state
interest in the accurate and efficient disposition of a decedent's
property at death.'"5 Inquirr should then focus on whether this
state interest in protecting the estate from the disruptive intru-
sion of lost or hidden heirs is furthered by or substantially
related to a legislative classification that places acknowledged
illegitimates behind all other related takers of the estate. Read-
ing Trimble in light of Lalli, a discrimination against illegiti-
mate children is prohibited once parentage is proven in accord-
ance with a statute providing for the requisite kind of evi-
dence. 0 It is difficult to imagine how the state interest justifies
placing illegitimates who are acknowledged, and have thus
proven parentage, at a point in the succession order where they
will rarely be entitled to inherit. If the acknowledged illegiti-
mate child of the father were totally excluded rather than
placed at a lower level in the order of succession, it cannot be
doubted that an unreasonable discrimination would exist. 07
How then can the state be allowed to indirectly accomplish (at
least substantially) what it could not do directly?
If the illegitimate may inherit, why then may he not in-
herit equally? The only possible relationship this writer can
discover between the low priority in the succession order given
illegitimates in their father's succession and the interest in
land titles, is that the worrisome possibility of fraudulent and
104. See text at note 12, supra.
105. See text at note 20, supra.
106. See text at note 49, supra.
107. This is the exact reason why the Illinois statute was struck down in Trimble.
See text at note 23, supra.
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belated claims will arise infrequently. Since the illegitimate
can take only when there are no other legitimate relations, the
state would be the only one affected by any spurious claims.
However, if this slight benefit were considered a sufficient ra-
tionale for article 919, it is easy to perceive that other states
could rewrite their laws to technically comply with constitu-
tional mandates by simply placing the illegitimate at the end
of the succession line. It is extremely doubtful that the courts
will allow a state legislature to avoid granting equality by using
what could be termed a "loophole."''0
While not clearly unconstitutional, article 919 certainly is
questionable and it is therefore suggested that the article be
repealed. The possibility of receiving alimony even if the illegi-
timate child is excluded under articles 918 and 919'10 is not
sufficient to justify the classifications, since the right to ali-
mony and the right to inheritance are two entirely different
concepts. Alimony should not be permitted to substitute for
the child's right to an inheritance. The acknowledged illegiti-
mate child of the father should be allowed to inherit equally
with legitimate children, to the exclusion of other potential
heirs.
Article 920 is analogous to the repealed article 1488 in
restricting the rights of an adulterous or incestuous child to
mere alimony. Discrimination within the class of illegitimates,
based solely on the child's conception resulting from the par-
ent's adultery, was prohibited in Robins."10 Therefore, at a min-
imum, the bastard child who has proven paternity must be
allowed the rights given other illegitimate children in articles
918 and 919 as they now stand. Furthermore, if articles 918 and
919 are found unconstitutional, then the adulterous or inces-
108. If constitutional mandates could be successfully met by permitting the
illegitimate child to inherit, but only after all other relatives, then the Trimble decision
would be senseless. Certainly, a significant category of illegitimate children would
thereby be excluded from the father's succession, a result prohibited by Trimble. See
text at note 43, supra.
109. See text at note 100, supra.
110. See text at note 71, supra. Although the opinion in Robins dealt only with
adulterous illegitimate children, there is no reason why the same rationale may not
be extended to the incestuous illegitimate child. There is no rational relationship
between (1) a classification which treats incestuous illegitimate children differently
from other illegitimates and (2) the state concern over the stability of land titles.
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tuous illegitimate who proves paternity must be treated
equally with the legitimate child. Although article 204, which
governs the acknowledgment procedure, precludes the ac-
knowledgment of these children,"' this article is also constitu-
tionally weak after Robins, since there is no rational basis for
the discrimination."2
Whether an illegitimate who proves paternity is constitu-
tionally entitled to inherit from the legitimate relations of the
parents whenever a legitimate child would have such a right,"3
is an issue which has not yet arisen in the Louisiana or United
States Supreme Court. Many states allow the illegitimate to
inherit equally with legitimates in the estates of the mother's
relatives, while restricting the illegitimate's inheritance from
the father's relations, usually in accordance with paternity
proof. '" There do not appear to be any additional justifications
for discrimination merely because the decedent is a more dis-
tant relation, and it follows that the analysis discussed pre-
viously will control in these situations also. Thus, if the child
has met the burden of proving parentage, he should possess the
same rights that a legitimate child possesses."'
1"11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 204 provides: "Such acknowledgment shall not be made
in favor of children whose parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time
of conception; however, such acknowledgment may be made if the parents should
contract a legal marriage with each other."
112. It should be noted that as Louisiana'a articles now read, acknowledgment
is the kind of evidence necessary for inheritance. LA. Cw. CODE arts. 917-21.
113. LA. CIv. CODE art. 921.
114. A statute that precluded intestate inheritance by paternal kindred from an
illegitimate child was upheld by a New York court in a case where there had been no
order of filiation. Estate of Fay, 404 N.Y.S.2d 554, 375 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. App. 1978).
The validity of this statute with its limitation imposed would concur with LaWi, but
there remains the question of the effect of such a statute where there is an order of
filiation. It may be argued that it is unconstitutional to prevent an illegitimate, who
could inherit intestate from his father, from inheriting from his father's kindred under
the same circumstances. The paternity issue aside, such a determination would de-
pend on whether the state had any valid interests in treating illegitimate children
unequally with respect to the father's kindred as opposed to a clear right to inheritance
from the mother's kindred. Perhaps such an argument could be found in the presumed
intent of paternal relations, but it is doubtful. See note 19, supra, and accompanying
text.
115. One such right is found in article 1705 of the Louisiana Civil Code, in which
the birth of a legitimate child or the adoption or legitimation of a child subsequent to




Illegitimates are not considered to be forced heirs in Louis-
iana and can thus be freely disinherited by their parents,"'
although their legitimate counterparts may only be disinher-
ited for reasons narrowly defined in the Civil Code."' Forced
heirship involves the same considerations discussed in the in-
testate succession area, since both concern rights to inheritance
not granted by a will. Therefore, the primary state interest
advanced to justify the exclusion of the illegitimate child is
likely to be the stability of land titles. The protection of an
estate from the possibility of belated or fraudulent claims is
arguably not furthered by permitting a parent to disinherit his
acknowledged illegitimate child when he cannot disinherit a
legitimate child. If forced heirship is to continue in favor of the
illegitimate child should revoke a will could depend on whether such child would be
entitled to inherit intestate. If so, then his birth should revoke a prior will. This is
illustrated in a New Jersey case, in which a statute identical to that in Trimble,
requiring in addition to marriage, that the father treat and recognize the child as his
own, was struck down. In re Estate of Sharp, 151 N.J. Super. 579, 377 A.2d 730 (N.J.
1977). Venturing that based on Trimble, Labine could be treated as overruled, and
holding that the intestate statute in question was invalid, the New Jersey court found
that an afterborn illegitimate child would render null the father's will executed before
the child's birth. Id. at 585, 377 A.2d at 732. The court held that if the child could not
be a beneficiary of his father's estate, then his birth would not render the will null. Id.
Another problem arises as to the interpretation of the word "children" as desig-
nated by a testator in his will. Again, it is arguable that this word should include
illegitimate children who could otherwise inherit intestate. However, the testator's
reference to "my children" or "our children" could be crucial. If he refers to "our
children" then it very well may be that his illegitimate children were not intended to
be included.
Following Trimble, many courts faced the question of whether the word
"children" in a trust or will includes illegitimates. A New York court held that the
inclusion of illegitimates would be determined by the facts in each case, since the
intent of the testator controls and is to be construed in light of the statutes and
decisions applicable at the time of execution of the will. Estate of Leventritt, 400
N.Y.S.2d 298, 92 Misc. 2d 598 (N.Y. Surr. 1977). In an Alabama case, the state
supreme court held that a question of fact arises when a testator, who had allegedly
recognized and supported an illegitimate child, referred to "my children" in his will.
Walton v. Lindsey, 349 So. 2d 41 (Ala. 1977).
116. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493 provides: "Donations inter vivos and mortis causa
can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease,
a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he leaves three
or a greater number."
117. There are ten just causes for the disinherison of legitimate children recog-
nized by law. LA. Civ. CODE art 1621.
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legitimate child, then it should also exist in favor of the illegiti-
mate child along with the corresponding rights to demand re-
duction and collation. The Louisiana constitution provides
that "no law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination
of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the
grounds for disinherison shall be provided by law.""' 8 There-
fore, it would be consistent with the constitution to allow the
illegitimate the rights of forced heirship equivalent to those a
legitimate possesses.
The suggestion has been made that in the case of forced
heirship and intestate succession, the illegitimate should re-
ceive his portion in the form of a credit against the estate rather
than a fractional interest in the succession." 9 It is argued that
this would reduce potential problems with the stability of com-
mercial transactions. Since such a procedure would further this
vital interest, it would almost certainly withstand any consti-
tutional challenges based on equal protection.2 0 It is not dis-
crimination as such which is prohibited by the constitution,
but unreasonable discimination. This device, along with others
such as shortening the statute of limitations in which to assert
claims to the estate, would be substantially related to legiti-
mate state objectives. 2'
Proof of Paternity
After Trimble and Lalli, the only remaining barrier to ab-
solute equality for illegitimate children is proof of parentage.' 2
Since this prerequisite to inheritance is based on the state's
interest in the stability of land titles, standards of proof should
be fashioned so as to maximize the rights of illegitimates while
at the same time guarding the estate from belated and fraudu-
lent claims. How such a compromise should be structured is
118. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5.
119. This plan has been suggested by Professor Robert Pascal. See Pascal,
Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by
Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. Rv. 167, 181-82 (1972).
120. See text at note 49, supra.
121. Even the dissent in Lalli approves less drastic means than the sole criterion
of a filiation order to assure the protection of the estate from belated claims. These
include publication notice and a short statute of limitations period. 99 S. Ct. at 530.
122. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 208-12 (methods of proving paternity).
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probably the most pervasive and puzzling aspect of the provi-
sions affected by these Supreme Court decisions.
With respect to inheritance from the mother the relative
ease with which maternity is proved will mean that proof of
parentage probably should impose no additional burden on the
illegitimate child. Since there are usually witnesses to most
births and since some sort of record is almost always kept,'2 3 it
is suggested that the illegitimate be treated equally with legiti-
mate children with respect to inheritance from the mother.
Proof of paternity procedure is quite a different matter.
Under the succession articles as they now read, illegitimates
may inherit once they are acknowledged.'2 As already indi-
cated, the acknowledgment laws should conform to constitu-
tional mandates so as to allow the acknowledgment of all illegi-
timates, regardless of how they are conceived.' 5 Acknowledg-
ment in Louisiana may be by formal means or by an informal
act of the parent indicating parentage.' 6 Although informal
acknowledgment would provide sufficient accuracy and reli-
ability in proof of maternity, the possibility of requiring more
formal proof of paternity as a prerequisite to intestate inheri-
tance should be considered. Rather than acknowledgment,
stricter standards of paternity proof could be incorporated into
the succession articles.'"
If the goal of the state is to ensure the efficient and orderly
distribution of property passing from decedents, it is necessary
123. See note 103, supra.
124. However, the acknowledged illegitimate is treated differently from legiti-
mates.
125. See text at notes 111-12, supra.
126. Acknowledgment may be formal, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 203, or informal.
Professor Pascal states that "[ilnformal acknowledgment results from any act of the
parent expressing or implying parentage of the child, and decisions have given it the
same effect as formal acknowledgment for all purposes in favor of the child, but never
in favor of the parent." Pascal, supra note 119, at 169.
127. However, with respect to standards of proof it is clear that a statute permit-
ting an illegitimate to inherit intestate from the father only if he marries the mother
is unconstitutional. Trimble so held. See text at note 45, supra. See Murray v. Murray,
564 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1978); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1978); Rudolph
v. Rudolph, 556 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. App. 1977). One case relied expressly on Trimble,
while the other, relying on Kentucky's state constitution, remarked that the problem
of proof of paternity seemed more reasonably to address itself to evidentiary standards
than to the outright barring of claims. 556 S.W.2d at 155.
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to determine what kinds of evidence will further this goal.
These could include proof by filiation order, formal acknowl-
edgment, or any other means of formal proof.2 An alternative
might be not to require a specific kind of evidence to the exclu-
sion of all others, but rather to impose a higher standard of
proof, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence." 9 Possi-
bly, the Uniform Probate Code could be used as a guide where
the primary qualification for inheritance focuses on the biologi-
cal relationship between parent and child. 3 0 A child would thus
128. Although the Lalli type statute mandating a filiation order as the exclusive
means of proof was upheld in New York, the same statute was found unconstitutional
in Tennessee in Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. 1978). However, one may
question whether the Tennessee Supreme Court misinterpreted what Trimble purport-
edly required. Although the court conceded that an illegitimate had to meet a stricter
standard of proof of paternity, it held that the denial of inheritance to a child whose
father openly and consistently acknowledged, lived with, and supported him, would
deprive the child of his inheritance unnecessarily as forbidden in Trimble. Id. at 835.
In essence, the court asserted that the method of proof chosen had to include all
children whose paternity determination would not interfere with the succession proce-
dure. The majority in Lalli, however, took a negative approach to Trimble in finding
a statute valid as long as it did not exclude a great number of illegitimates, even if it
excluded some unnecessarily. La~li recognized the lack of formal proof as a reasonable
exclusion, not applicable to an excessively large number of illegitimate children. See
note 47, supra, and accompanying text.
129. With respect to proof requirements, the Florida Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a statute that allowed illegitimate children to inherit from their father only
if the father acknowledged them in writing in the presence of a competent witness. In
re Estate of Burris, 361 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1978). While the Florida court recognized that
the state could be justified in imposing a high degree of proof of paternity in order to
prevent spurious claims, it found that this statute did not address the "standard of
proof" but merely set forth the kind of evidence required to prove the fact of paternity
to the exclusion of all other kinds of evidence. Id. at 155. The court found it significant
that not even proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be sufficient. It thus interpreted
Trimble to require that the requisite standard include all illegitimate children whose
paternity ascertainment will not interrupt the orderly and accurate settlement of es-
tates. This decision was clearly contrary to Lalli, which specifically permitted a state
to require an exclusive method of proof of paternity. However, does Lai require that
there be a filiation order before inheritance is allowed, or is any evidentiary criteria
sufficient? In a footnote, the Lalli majority noted that they were not restricting "a
state's freedom to require proof of paternity by means other than a judicial decree."
99 S. Ct. at 5260 n.8. If under the Florida statute, the child had a paternity order but
lacked the requisite acknowledgment, could the state permissibly eliminate him from
inheritance? It would seem logical that if the lesser is sufficient proof, then surely the
greater should not be considered inadequate. Perhaps the statute would be thus inter-
preted, but the problem remains as to whether Lalli mandates this result.
130. See text at note 50, supra.
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be treated as a child of the father if the natural parents partici-
pate in a marriage ceremony, if paternity is established by
adjudication before the death of the father, or if paternity is
established thereafter by clear and convincing proof. Use of an
elevated standard of proof of paternity would pose some prob-
lems as to the line of inquiry the procedure should encom-
pass. 3' It is suggested that the use of scientific evidence, blood
testing, and perhaps lie detector tests should be permissible. 3 '
In fact, any evidence which will assure accuracy should be
allowed.
Once the kind of evidence required is established, an even
more difficult problem for resolution arises-the timing of such
proof. In Lalli, the Court upheld the New York statute requir-
ing a filiation order during the father's lifetime, but it specifi-
cally avoided addressing the limitation that the order issue
within two years of the birth of the child. 13  Presumably, such
a short statute of limitations would be constitutionally imper-
missible since it would allow the illegitimate child himself no
opportunity to assert his parentage. At a minimum, a statute
must allow proof of paternity any time before the father's
death, but it seems to this writer that the opportunity must
extend even beyond the father's death. A particular example
of the necessity of this extension is demonstrated in the case
of posthumous illegitimate children. 3' Since the father has
131. The constitutionality of the presumption of legitimacy when a child is born
in wedlock may raise problems once an illegitimate is entitled to inherit from the
natural parent. LA. Civ. CODE art. 184. An Arkansas statute creating such a presump-
tion was upheld, based on policy considerations. Brown v. Danley, 263 Ark. 480, 566
S.W.2d 385 (1978). This decision may be consistent with Lalli since it involved no
discrimination between illegitimates and legitimates; the claimant was legitimate and
could inherit from the legitimate father. However, the validity of a presumption that
ignores the true biological realtionship between the parties is questionable.
132. See Lorio, supra note 2, at 24-27 for recommended revisions of Louisiana
Civil Code articles providing for proof of paternity.
133. See note 33, supra.
134. In two Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions, a statute that provided for an
illegitimate to inherit intestate from the father only if paternity was adjudicated dur-
ing the father's life, admitted in open court, or acknowledged in a signed writing was
upheld with respect to posthumous children. Robinson v. Kolstad, 84 Wisc. 2d 579,
267 N.W.2d 886 (1978); Estate of Blumreich, 84 Wisc. 2d 545, 267 N.W.2d 870 (1978).
However, there was a vigorous dissent in Robinson as to the constitutionality of this
statute as applied to an illegitimate child whose father died less than forty-eight hours
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died before the child is even born, it is arguable that a statute
restricting proof to a period prior to the date of death would
virtually disinherit an entire class of illegitimate children, pro-
hibited in Trimble and Lalli. The unlikelihood that a father
will ever acknowledge his paternity or the mother institute a
paternity action before the child's birth is obvious.
Perhaps the better solution would be the imposition of a
short limitations period in which claims against the estate
could be filed. This would serve the asserted state interest by
eliminating belated claims which are the ones more likely to be
fraudulent, while at the same time allowing the illegitimate
child a reasonable period of time after the father's death in
which to prove paternity and assert his rights to the estate.
Publication notice should also be considered since it would aid
justification of a short limitations period and afford the child
notice of his right.
Although the above suggestions with respect to proof of
paternity may meet with constitutional challenges, such at-
tacks will almost certainly be unsuccessful since this difference
in treatment appears clearly justified and constitutionally rea-
sonable. Trimble and Lai recognized the essential state inter-
est in the just and orderly disposition of a decedent's property
at death. Both decisions also noted the paramount interest of
the illegitimate in the succession of his parents. The safeguards
suggested may accomplish the delicate compromise needed
between these two competing interests. The attitude of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Robins and Thompson is indica-
tive of a desire to achieve this balance and overturn the one-
sided approach of the Civil Code. It is hoped that procedural
safeguards will be utilized in the future to grant to the illegiti-
mate the full enjoyment of his constitutional rights.
Susan Swanner Lasiter
after he learned of the pregnancy. For any posthumous child, the statute's require-
ments are nearly impossible to meet. "A prenatal paternity proceeding is as unlikely
as the written acknowledgment of a fetus." 84 Wisc. 2d at 586, 267 N.W.2d at 889 (Day,
J., dissenting). Indeed, even the majority recognized that "[iff it could be said that
the legislative enactment categorically disinherited posthumous illegitimate children,
the argument of denial of equal protection . . . would rise to a different dimension."
Id. at 585, 267 N.W.2d at 888. For all practical purposes this is what the legislature
has done by restricting proof to a period prior to the date of death.
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